Adversarial examples are maliciously tweaked images that can easily fool machine learning techniques, such as neural networks, but they are normally not visually distinguishable for human beings. One of the main approaches to solve this problem is to retrain the networks using those adversarial examples, namely adversarial training. However, standard adversarial training might not actually change the decision boundaries but cause the problem of gradient masking, resulting in a weaker ability to generate adversarial examples [39] . Therefore, it cannot alleviate the problem of black-box attacks, where adversarial examples generated from other networks can transfer to the targeted one. In order to reduce the problem of black-box attacks, we propose a novel method that allows two networks to learn from each others' adversarial examples and become resilient to black-box attacks. We also combine this method with a simple domain adaptation to further improve the performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks have been widely used to do facial recognition, surveillance, autonomous driving and other tasks that require a high standard of safety. However, it has been found that by adding some unnoticeable perturbations to original input images, i.e. adversarial noise, deep neural networks can be easily fooled [12] . Furthermore, these adversarial examples often transfer, which means that adversarial examples that fool one network can also easily fool others. This is known as black-box attacks [29] . In order to increase robustness to the transferability of adversarial examples for faces, we propose a novel method that allows two networks to learn from each others' adversarial examples.
Standard adversarial training is proven to be effective to the same type of white-box attacks that are used for the training process [23] [37] , but ineffective to black-box attacks due to the problem of gradient masking [38] . After a network has been trained, its adversarial examples can be generated using various methods, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method or Least Likely Class method. These adversarial examples can easily fool the network as they are found using the network's weights and gradients. They are known as whitebox attacks [38] . Standard adversarial training retrains a network using original data and its white-box adversarial examples to make it more robust to the same type of whitebox attacks [12] . However, it has been found that adversarial examples generated from defended networks (using standard adversarial training) lose the ability to easily fool other undefended networks due to the problem of gradient masking [38] . Furthermore, it has also been found that the decision This work was supported by department of Automotive Electronics Applications (AEA), Lite-On Singapore Pte. Ltd. 556741, Singapore) boundaries of the defended networks (using standard adversarial training) remain unchanged, and thus the defended networks remain vulnerable to black-box attacks [39] .
We propose a method that trains two networks simultaneously to make both of them more resilient to blackbox attacks from a third holdout network, and we name it Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method (SAT M). SAT M is implemented and tested on the Adience dataset where 26,580 faces are labelled with gender and age group [7] . We show some visually noticeable adversarial examples on Adience dataset and we find that, unlike databases for object recognition, those adversarial examples can be visually misleading to human beings when the adversarial noise is set to be large enough. Additionally, we find that, for networks that do not have batch normalisation layers [18] such as VGGNets [36] , distribution of features of adversarial examples is different from distribution of features of original data. Therefore, we add a domain adaptation [9] to further improve generalisability.
In this paper, we introduce methods to generate adversarial examples and methods to prevent white-box and black-box attacks in Section II. Dataset and some visually noticeable adversarial examples are shown in Section III. In Section IV we introduce our methodology in details and in Section V we show and analyse experimental results. Finally, we draw a conclusion and discuss about potential future work for this project in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Various countermeasures for adversarial examples have been proposed for different types of attacks. Two main defense approaches are: 1) detecting and rejecting adversarial examples in testing stage to prevent adversarial attacks, and 2) making networks themselves more robust to adversarial examples, e.g. adversarial training. In this section, algorithms for generating adversarial examples are listed first, and then some state-of-the-art countermeasures are introduced.
A. Algorithms for Generating Adversarial Examples 1) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): FGSM computes one step gradient and adds the sign of the gradient to raw images [12] . It is defined as:
where x is raw images, y true is the labels, J is the loss function and ε controls the magnitude of the adversarial noise. Step-LL replaced y true with y least likely , and [19] showed it was the most effective for adversarial training on ImageNet. It is defined as:
where y least likely = argmin y {p(y|x)} and p(y|x) is the probability that the network would predict y given x.
3) Randomised single-step attack (R+Step-LL): [38] showed that the vicinity of data points in loss function is not smooth. Simply using FGSM or ILLC might not suffice to find the actual adversarial direction. Therefore, they proposed a new randomised single-step attack which adds a small random step to escape from the non-smooth vicinity before computing gradients. R+Step-LL is defined as:
where
Other algorithms such as DeepFool [26] , CPPN EA Fool [28] , Hot/Cold method [32] and Natural GANs [42] can also be used to generate adversarial examples. Particularly, [5] used spatial transformation to tweak facial landmark locations to create adversarial examples for facial tasks. Besides, stronger adversarial attacks that require much less perturbations such as L 2 , L 0 , L ∞ attacks introduced by [2] can be used to be the main adversarial attacks for future work. They often succeed with 100% probability with less than 4/256 distortion and normally they will not be visibly noticeable. Additionally, Step-LL, FGSM and R+Step-LL can be iterated many times but in this paper we would focus on R+Step-LL attack and we direct readers to [11] for further insights about iterative attacks. However, even though [11] is effective to weak iterative adversarial attacks, it has been broken by [3] . We direct readers to a holistic survey [41] for further information about generating adversarial examples, and a toolbox [10] for analysing adversarial attacks for face recognition systems.
In order to make experimental results more comparable with Ensemble Adversarial Training where R+Step-LL was originally introduced [38] , we use the same method to generate adversarial examples for both training and testing with ε = 16/256 and α = ε/2.
B. Countermeasures Without Adversarial Training
Both the two main defense approaches mentioned above in Section II can fight against adversarial examples without adversarial training. In this section, we introduce cuttingedge methods of the first type and methods of the second type that do not involve adversarial training. They were proven to be effective for weak adversarial attacks such as FGSM or
Step-LL but some of them have been broken by stronger attacks [3] such as L 2 , L 0 , L ∞ attacks [2] .
In testing stage, adversarial examples can be prevented by either: 1) train a separate classifier to distinguish adversarial examples from clean data [22] [25] [14] [16], or 2) find the differences between them by analysing their features. A wide variety of tricks can be used in the first case. For example, [17] used soft labels and added a null class to counteract adversarial examples. In the second case, features that are chosen to distinguish adversarial examples from clean data vary. For example, [8] found the certainty of adversarial examples is higher than clean data from a Bayesian perspective and [24] found coefficients in low-ranked components between adversarial examples and clean data were different. However, they have both been broken by stronger attacks with a slight increase in distortion [3] [4] . Given that [33] found that adversarial examples have a different distribution from clean data, we combine a simple domain adaptation with our method to further improve the performance.
It is also possible to make networks more resilient to adversarial examples without adversarial training, [30] used high-temperature softmax to make models less sensitive to unnoticeable perturbations. [35] used double backpropagation to penalise large gradients and they found the regularisation scheme was equivalent to first order adversarial training. However, it has been shown that distillation does not make networks more robust to stronger attacks [2] [1] . [34] trained a Defense-GAN using clean data to find the most similar generated images to the input images, and then sent the generated images to do classification instead of the input ones that might contain adversarial noises. This method was proven to be robust to both white and black box attacks [34] . [13] used features from intermediate layers to find the most sensitive layers which contain the most adversely affected filters, and then used selective dropout to disable the affected filters to mitigate the effect of adversarial attacks.
C. Adversarial Training Methods
Using adversarial training introduced by [12] can prevent white-box attacks. However, instead of generally reducing adversarial vulnerability, the method can cause the problem of gradient masking [38] . Due to the problem, after firststep adversarial training, the adversarially trained networks can only generate adversarial examples that are easier for undefended networks to classify, but the decision boundaries of the adversarially trained networks remain unchanged [39] . Thus, the adversarially trained networks remain vulnerable to black-box attacks.
In order to reduce the risk of black-box attacks, [38] proposed a method of ensemble adversarial training which used one pre-trained network only for generating adversarial examples and then used those adversarial examples to train another network. This way, the adversarially trained network became more resilient to black-box attacks from a third holdout network.
Similarly, [27] proposed a method of cascade adversarial machine learning regularized with a unified embedding which uses one already defended network to generate adversarial examples to re-train another one. They found iterative attacks transfer more easily between networks that are trained using the same strategy i.e. standard training/Kurakin's ad-versarial training [19] . They also introduce a regularisation with a unified embedding which aligns features of adversarial examples and their corresponding clean data. This way, visually similar images would have similar features and it thus improves robustness of networks.
III. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES OF FACES
In this section, we first introduce the dataset we use and then we show comparisons between original data and visually noticeable adversarial examples. We find that, unlike object recognition, some adversarial examples can be misleading for human beings. Finally, we show some results on white-box attacks with different parameter values. Adversarial examples of faces are posing serious safety threads to many face recognition systems, driver monitoring systems and security surveillance systems. Therefore a more effective method to fight against this type of adversarial examples is necessary.
The Adience dataset contains 26,580 unconstrained images of faces from 2,284 subjects, each of them is labelled with gender and eight age groups (0-2, 4-6, 8-13, 15-20, 25-32, 38-43, 48-53, 60-). These images were collected from the Flickr albums and they were authorisedly released by their authors under the Creative Commons (CC) license. All images were taken completely "in the wile", which means they were taken under different variations in appearance, noise, pose, blurring and lighting conditions [7] . According to its protocol, five cross validation is used to make results more statistically significant [20] [21] . We conduct experiments and report results on age-group classification only to show clear improvement.
The comparison between some clean testing images and their adversarial examples on the Adience dataset is shown in Figure 1 . These clean testing images are all classified correctly by a ResNet50-Face [15] that is pre-trained on the VGGFace Database [31] and fine-tuned on the Adience dataset. However, their adversarial examples (that are generated using R+Step-LL) are all misclassified. Similar results can be found if we use VGG16-Face that is pre-trained on the VGGFace database. As shown in Figure 1 , when ε of the Equation 3 (R+Step-LL) is set to be large enough, we can see the difference between the original data and adversarial examples clearly. We found that these adversarial examples can be visually misleading to human beings. For example, the adversarial example of the top left pair actually looks more senior than the clean one, and the adversarial example of the top right pair looks younger than its clean counterpart.
When ε is set to be between 8/256 and 16/256, adversarial examples on the Adience dataset become less visually noticeable but remain the ability to easily fool networks as shown in Table I . We thus choose R+Step-LL with ε = 16/256 and α = ε/2 to generate adversarial examples for the following experiments.
IV. SIMULTANEOUS ADVERSARIAL TRAINING METHOD
We proposed Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method (SAT M) to counteract black-box attacks. The procedure is shown in Figure 2 and the algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. x ← x + α · sign(N(0 d , I d ) 19: x adv ← x + (ε − α) · sign( x Network loss (x , y true )) 20:
Algorithm 1 Simultaneous Adversarial Training Method

return x adv
Return adversarial examples 21: end function This method re-trains two networks simultaneously using clean data and adversarial examples that are generated from the other network. This way, both networks become more resilient to black-box attacks from a third holdout network. We also combine a simple domain adaptation method with SAT M, which improves generalisability especially for networks that do not include batch normalisation layers such as VGGNets.
A. Simultaneous Adversarial Training
SAT M re-trains two networks simultaneously but in this section we describe the method from the perspective of one network first, and then we introduce the scalability of SAT M and generalise it to training multiple (more than two) networks simultaneously.
As explained in Algorithm 1, for Network A , SAT M uses clean data and adversarial examples that are generated from Network B to re-train it. In order to avoid the problem of gradient masking to the largest extent, we do not use adversarial examples that are generated from Network A itself (namely white-box adversarial examples) to re-train it. Therefore, after Network A has been re-trained using 
B. Domain Adaptation
We combine domain adaptation with SAT M as shown in Figure 2 . For networks without batch normalisation layers such as VGGNets, the distribution of clean data and the distribution of adversarial examples can be different. We use a simple domain adaptation block (a binary classifier with two fully-connected layers with 512 and 256 hidden units respectively) to reduce the difference and improve generalisability. For Network A , the domain adaptation block distinguishes features of clean data from features of Network B 's adversarial examples. As shown in Figure 2 , the gradient of the domain adaptation block will go though a gradient reversal layer and then flow back to Network A . This way, those features generated from Network A become more indistinguishable and the generalisability is thus improved [9] . More advanced domain adaptation methods such as Adversarial Discriminative Domain Adaption [40] can be used to replace the simplest domain adaptation block, but here we mainly focus on SAT M and simply show that by combing a domain adaptation method with SAT M, networks can be more resilient to black-box attacks.
C. SAT M with Multiple Networks
Multiple networks can be re-trained using SAT M. when retraining Network A , Network B ...Network K , for Network A , clean data and adversarial examples that are generated from Network B , Network C ... Network K would be used to re-train it. Adversarial examples can be generated by those networks interchangeably to ensure that we still use clean data 50 percents of the time. More advanced domain adaptation methods should be used to deal with the multi-domain adaptation problem. However, when more than two networks are included, the batch size can be smaller than two, which might affect the performance of batch normalisation layers and the domain adaptation method. Therefore we leave SAT M with multiple networks to future work. We believe that SAT M with multiple networks would enumerate more types of adversarial perturbations. Therefore, networks might finally become more robust against black-box attacks using SAT M with multiple networks.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we show experimental results on the Adience dataset (age-group classification) using SATM. We use SATM to re-train fine-tuned VGG16-Face and ResNet50-Face simultaneously. We show results of white-box attacks first, and then we show results of black-box attacks both before and after using SATM and we show that SATM converges. Finally we show black-box attacks results from a third holdout network (which is chosen to be Resnet101 or InceptionResNetV2 that are pre-trained on ImageNet and fine-tuned on the Adience dataset) before and after SATM. Results are evaluated using classification rate and one-off classification rate. One-off classification rate is defined as:
where C is the number of classes and con f usion matrix[c, k] is the number of examples of class c that are (mis-)classified as class k [20] . Five cross-validation that is defined in [20] is used as the protocol to evaluate performance, so the results are statistically significant.
A. White-Box Attacks
As shown in Table II , both networks become more robust to white-box attacks, even though SAT M is not designed to prevent white-box attacks; SATM does not use any whitebox adversarial examples to re-train networks but the classification rate and one-off rate of white-box attacks generated using retrained networks still increase. As shown in Table III , the first column is the models we are testing on, and the second column is the models that are used to generate adversarial examples (attacks). After using SAT M, classification rate and one-off almost remain unchanged, which indicates that adversarial examples that are generated from these adversarially re-trained networks remain "strong" enough to easily fool undefended networks such as InceptionV3. This shows that the improvement for white-box attacks does not come from the problem of gradient masking.
B. Black-Box Attacks
As shown in Table IV , after VGG16-Face and ResNet50-Face have been adversarially trained using SAT M, they both become resilient to each others' adversarial examples generated using retrained networks. Classification rates of black-box attacks increase to 52.40% and 43.25%, which are very close to the classification rates on clean testing data (56.29% and 51.77%). 
C. Convergence
As shown in Figure 3 and 
D. Black-Box Attacks from a Third Holdout Network
As shown in Table V , we can see a significant improvement of the performance on black-box attacks from a third holdout network, namely ResNet101 and InceptionRes-NetV2 (shortened as IncResV2). We also show that SAT M outperforms the state-of-the-art adversarial training method 
E. Experiments on Networks with the Same Structure
We set both Network A and Network B to be ResNet50-Face (the same structure and the same initialisation), and found that this led to divergence of the algorithm. A potential reason is: this way, these two networks are learning from their own "white-box attacks", while they are not able to mask each others' gradients. Additionally, we also conduct experiments on ResNet50-Face and ResNet50-ImageNet (the same structure and different initialisation). As shown in Table VI, this combination leads to a 2.42% accuracy improvement on adversarial examples generated from ResNet101-Img, however it also leads to a 2.64% accuracy decrease on adversarial examples generated from InceptionResNetV2. This may be because that adversarial examples generated from ResNet101-Img resembles adversarial examples generated from ResNet50-Img, while they are less correlated with adversarial examples generated from InceptionResNetV2.
F. Experiments on Other Databases
A series of experiments on MNIST and ImageNet database are also conducted, however, no significant improvement on ImageNet database and no improvement on MNIST database (not worse either) are found compared with Ensemble Adversarial Training method [38] . For ImageNet, we use the same testing method as [38] where 10,000 testing images are randomly chosen. InceptionResV2 and VGG16 are retrained using SATM, and ResNet101 is chosen to be the third holdout network to generate black-box attacks. As shown in Table VII , compared with ensemble adversarial training, SATM decreases top-1 error rate by 0.6% and top-5 error rate by 0.2% on ImageNet. For MNIST, we re-train structure A and B [38] , and we report averaged black-box attacks error rate for structure A. As shown in Table VII , no significant improvement can be found on MNIST database using SATM compared with ensemble adversarial training.
Different adversarial training methods can be more effective in different domains (hand-written numbers, faces or objects classification). A potential reason that SAT M is more effective in age-group classification can be that the distribution of adversarial examples of faces changes more quickly during the re-training process. Compared with handwritten numbers or objects classification, SATM enumerates more adversarial examples with different distributions when doing age-group classification. Therefore, it achieved more significant improvement on age-group classification. However, this needs to be supported by a more complete hypothesis and further experiments, and we leave this topic to future work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a novel method (Simultaneously Adversarial Training Method) which trains multiple networks simultaneously to improve their robustness to black-box attacks without encountering the problem of gradient masking. In order to achieve this, SAT M uses adversarial examples that are generated from other networks to re-train the targeted network. This way, these networks learn from others' adversarial examples dynamically and thus all become more resilient to single-step black-box attacks. Furthermore, we also include a simple domain adaptation method to align features of clean data and features of adversarial examples to improve the performance. We conduct a series of experiments and show that, by using SAT M, networks become slightly more resilient to single-step white-box attacks and significantly more resilient to single-step black-box attacks, while their adversarial examples remain "strong" enough to easily fool undefended networks. We also show that SAT M outperforms the state-of-the-art adversarial training method (Ensemble Adversarial Training) on single-step black-box attacks from holdout networks. In order to further improve the performance, white-box examples can be used with SAT M in various ways, stronger iterative adversarial attacks can be used, and a more deliberate domain adaptation method can be combined with SAT M.
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